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Abstract
This article outlines a semantic approach to the logics of unknown
truths, and the logic of false beliefs, using neighborhood structures,
giving results on soundness, completeness, and expressivity. Relational
semantics for the logics of unknown truths are also addressed, specifi-
cally the conditions under which sound axiomatizations of these logics
might be obtained from their normal counterparts, and the relationship
between reflexive insensitive logics (RI-logics) and logics containing the
provability operator  as the primary modal operator.
Introduction
This paper investigates the use of neighborhood frames as a semantics for
the logics of unknown truths and related non-normal epistemic systems,
including the logic of false beliefs. However, the interest in these logics is not
restricted to epistemic settings. As such, this paper is perhaps better viewed
as a continuation of the study of reflexive-insensitive logics (we borrow this
terminology from [3]) that was initiated in [5] and further developed in [7]
and [3]. In addition to this more systematic motive, it is also our desire to
further elucidate (and exploit, in some cases) the connections between these
logics and provability logics.1
∗We would like to thank the participants of the Frontiers of Non-Classicality conference
for helpful conversations on the contents of this paper. We would also like to thank the
organizers of that conference. We are grateful to the editors of this journal, and to the
anonymous referee, whose insightful comments and suggestions improved the paper. This
research was partially supported by FAPESP (Sa˜o Paulo Research Foundation) grant
number 2013/25095-4.
1In addition to the epistemic interpretations, reflexive-insensitive logics (RI-logics) also
have a metaphysical interpretation, introduced by Marcos [5], where they are understood
as formalizing the notion of a proposition being “accidentally true”. These logics are also
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While finding applications throughout philosophical logic, the logics on
which we focus actually have their genesis in paraconsistent logics. Specif-
ically, they surfaced out of attempts to provide a modal interpretation of
the consistency operator found in the logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs).2
In the search for applications to relational structures of a metatheoretical
operator of consistency (expressed in the object language with ◦), it was
investigated whether it is possible to modally interpret ◦ in such a way that
the resulting modal logics could still be considered LFIs (i.e., trivialization
would occur when not only a formula ϕ and its negation were derivable, but
also the formula ◦ϕ, expressing the consistency of ϕ). Both a positive and
a negative answer was found in [6]. On the one hand, it was shown that by
interpreting ◦ϕ as ϕ → ϕ, and a paraconsistent negation ∼ as ♦¬, it is
possible to obtain modal LFIs. On the other hand, any hope for discovering
new interesting applications of LFIs by means of such an interpretation is
unrealistic. The latter observation is expressed by the following result.
Fact. (Marcos [6]) For every normal modal logic, a language L, using ∧,
∨, →, ¬, , and ♦ as logical symbols, and a language L′, using ∧, ∨, →,
∼, and ◦ as logical symbols, characterize the same logic under two different
signatures.
However, the above result can also be read as accentuating the non-
classical character of normal modal logics, and this was indeed the reading
proposed in [6]. Specifically, it concretely articulates the intuition that the
boundary between the global, intensional, character of modal logic and the
local, extensional, perspective is also part of the dividing line between non-
classicality and classicality. Pursuing this investigation of the tenuous border
between classical and non-classical, the study of logics using the above modal
interpretation of the ◦ operator and a classical negation gave rise to the
definition and characterization of RI-logics, as in [3], by means of a relational
semantics.
This paper, on the other hand, investigates the use of neighborhood
frames for RI-logics, viewed epistemically as logics of unknown truths, and
the related non-normal epistemic systems formalizing the notion of false
belief. In the logic of unknown truths, first introduced by Steinsvold [8],
instead of considering the more common epistemic modalities “is known”
or “is believed”, the primitive modal operator is intended to formalize “is
the cousins of logics of contingency and non-contingency [4], for which a neighborhood
approach was given recently in [11].
2See [1] for a general, and recent, presentation of these logics.
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true, but not known”. In previous examinations of these logics, the seman-
tics employed were either topological (in [8]), or relational (in [7] and [9]).
To our knowledge, the appropriateness of neighborhood semantics for these
logics has not yet been explored. The purpose of this paper is to develop
just such a treatment.3 In fact, we argue that neighborhood semantics may
even be more appropriate because they accentuate properties of the logics
that may go under-appreciated when examined through the lens of relational
frames. For example, related to the expressivity of the logics, one can find
appropriate neighborhood frames for the logic of unknown truths that do
not correspond to any relational frames (whereas all appropriate relational
frames have a pointwise-equivalent neighborhood frame). A suggestive con-
clusion one may draw from these observations is that, in some sense, the
non-classicality of RI-logics resurfaces semantically in their weakness of ex-
pressivity, which is highlighted by the use of a finer-grained semantics.
In addition, it was initially hoped that switching to a neighborhood se-
mantics might aid efforts to answer problems about the logics of false belief
that were left open in [9], specifically issues relating to the appropriate W-
logic of transitive frames. While relational frames thrive on the elegance
of their binary accessibility relations, neighborhood semantics, while inar-
guably more encumbered with low-level set-theoretic machinery, allow for,
in some cases, a greater extent of mathematical control over the frames,
and thus their logics (hence allowing for the study of logics for which rela-
tional frames are not appropriate). And, in fact, the switch to neighborhood
frames does shed some light on the behavior of the W-logics. Unfortunately,
most of the results (in section 2.4, below) are negative, but they do suggest
possible approaches to the open problems one might explore.
1 Logics of Unknown Truths
1.1 Language
Rather than the usual modal language where ‘’ or ‘♦’ is primitive, we will
make use of a language, L◦, in which ‘◦’ is the primitive modal operator. Let
V ar be a countable set of propositional variables. The members of FormL◦ ,
the well-formed formulas of L◦, are defined recursively as:
3In addition, given that neighborhood frames can be seen as a generalization of both
relational and topological frames, it is our hope that studying the logics of unknown truths
and false beliefs together, from the perspective of this more general framework, will unite
the previous efforts.
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ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ◦ϕ
For p ∈ V ar. The usual definitions for ∨, → (material implication), etc.,
apply. In addition, we define • so that •ϕ stands for ¬ ◦ ϕ.
1.2 Axiomatization
In this paper, our basic logic will be the smallest set of formulas from
FormL◦ containing the following axioms, and closed under the given rules.
Axioms:
PL All instances of propositional tautologies
b0 ◦>
b1 •ϕ→ ϕ
b2 (◦ϕ ∧ ◦ψ)→ ◦(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Rules:
MP Modus Ponens
bN from ` ϕ→ ψ one can infer ` (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ)→ (◦ψ ∧ ψ)
This logic, which we can call BK, is sound and complete with respect
to the class of all relational frames. (This result was first proved in [5], and
extended in [7]. A more comprehensive investigation into the soundness and
completeness of these kinds of logics with respect to relational frames was
conducted in [3].) The main purpose of this paper is to explore the adequacy
of neighborhood semantics for BK, and potential extensions thereof.
1.3 Neighborhood Semantics
We briefly introduce the basic ideas surrounding neighborhood semantics in
this section. All of the definitions are more or less standard. One should
consult Chellas [2] for details.
Definition 1.1 (Neighborhood Frame). A neighborhood frame is a pair
〈W,n〉 where W is a non-empty set of states and n : W → P(P(W ))
is the neighborhood function (n(w) is the set of neighborhoods of w). A
neighborhood model is a triple 〈W,n, V 〉 where W and n are as before, and
V : V ar → P(W ) is a valuation function.
Truth at a state in a model for formulas can be defined recursively:
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M,w |= ϕ (or M,w 2 ϕ)
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= ◦ϕ iff if M,w |= ϕ then JϕKM ∈ n(w)
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where JϕKM := {w ∈ W | M,w |= ϕ} (the truth set of ϕ) (we will usually
omit the subscript when the model is clear from the context). Though we
are treating ◦ as primitive, one can semantically understand • as:
M,w |= •ϕ iff M,w |= ϕ and JϕKM 6∈ n(w)
It is for this reason that one might refer to these logics as the logics
of unknown truths. As is often the case in neighborhood semantics, the
presence of ϕ’s truth set in n(w) amounts to ϕ being known (or believed,
when the focus is doxastic). As such, •ϕ can be understood as saying that
ϕ is true (at some world or state), but is not known.
A formula ϕ is said to be globally true in a modelM just in caseM,w |= ϕ
for all w ∈ W . This will be denoted M |= ϕ. A formula is valid in a frame
iff it is globally true in all models based on the frame. Lastly, a formula
is valid with respect to a class of frames iff it is valid on each frame in the
class.4
We use the following definitions in order to provide frame characteriza-
tion theorems. Given a set W , F ⊆ P(W ) is said to
• be supplemented if for X,Y ∈ P(W ), X ∈ F and X ⊆ Y implies
Y ∈ F ;
• be closed under (binary) intersections if for X,Y ∈ P(W ), X ∈ F and
Y ∈ F implies (X ∩ Y ) ∈ F ;
• contain the unit if W ∈ F ;
• contain the core if
⋂
F ∈ F .
• is consistent if ∅ /∈ F and F 6= ∅
F is said to be a quasi-filter if it is supplemented and closed under inter-
sections. If it also contains the unit, then we simply call it a filter. If F is
supplemented and contains the core, then it is said to be augmented. (Hence,
being augmented implies being a filter, but not vice versa.) This terminol-
ogy can be extended to neighborhood frames in the obvious manner. For
4In the usual modal language, we have the following semantic clause for :
M,w |= ϕ iff JϕKM ∈ n(w)
Nothing else changes.
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example, if n(w) is augmented for all w ∈ W in some frame, then we say
that the frame itself is augmented.
Soundness of the axiomatization with respect to the semantics is readily
forthcoming.
Theorem 1.2. BK is sound with respect to the class of filters.
Proof. The proof is straightforward, and not unusual. The case of b0 makes
use of the fact that filters contain the unit, closure under binary intersection
is used for b2, and supplementation is needed for bN .

1.4 Completeness
In the following defintion, |ϕ|S stands for the set of all maximal S-consistent
sets (MaxCon(S)) that contain ϕ. Formally:
|ϕ|S := {Γ ∈ MaxCon(S) : ϕ ∈ Γ}
We will often refer to |ϕ|S as the proof set of ϕ.
Definition 1.3 (Canonical Model). Let S be a logical system extending BK
and M = 〈W,n, V 〉 be a neighborhood model. M is said to be a canonical
model for S iff the following conditions hold:
1. W = {Γ : Γ is a maximal S-consistent set of wff}
2. For every Γ ∈W , (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ iff |ϕ|S ∈ n(Γ)
3. V (p) = |p|S
When M is such a model, we will name it MS = 〈WS,nS, VS〉.
Note that n is well-defined. If |ϕ|S = |ψ|S, then `S ϕ ↔ ψ. From the
rule bN , we then have `S (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ)↔ (◦ψ ∧ ψ). Therefore, (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ iff
(◦ψ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ, and |ϕ|S ∈ nS(Γ) iff |ψ|S ∈ nS(Γ).
In addition, we will often refer to the minimal canonical model for a
logic. This is the logic in which each n(w) = {|ϕ|S : (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ w}, and
nothing more. In contrast, the maximal canonical model would result from
adding, to this set, the set of all non-proof sets. Usually, we will only be
concerned with the minimal canonical model.
(For the remainder of this section, we omit the S subscript where doing
so does not create problematic ambiguities.)
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Theorem 1.4. Let M be a canonical model for S. Then we have that
JϕKM = |ϕ|
Proof. We only show the cases for ◦.
Γ ∈ J◦ϕK iff either Γ /∈ JϕK or JϕK ∈ n(Γ).
If Γ /∈ JϕK then, by the induction hypothesis, we have that Γ /∈ |ϕ|. This
then immediately implies, from axiom b1, that Γ ∈ | ◦ ϕ|.
If JϕK ∈ n(Γ) then |ϕ| ∈ n(Γ), which in turn implies, from the definition
of the canonical model, that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ Γ. Therefore, Γ ∈ | ◦ ϕ|.
In the other direction, assume Γ ∈ |◦ϕ|. If it is also the case that Γ /∈ |ϕ|,
then Γ /∈ JϕK and so Γ ∈ J◦ϕK.
Otherwise, we have that Γ ∈ |ϕ| as well as Γ ∈ | ◦ϕ|. Thus Γ ∈ | ◦ϕ∧ϕ|.
Then, by definition, |ϕ| ∈ n(Γ), and so JϕK ∈ n(Γ). Therefore, Γ ∈ J◦ϕK.

Observation 1.5. The minimal canonical model for BK is not supple-
mented
Proof. The most straightforward, though somewhat cumbersome, way to
proceed is to pick an arbitrary X ⊆ W that is not a proof set (such an X
must exist based on cardinality considerations), and consider, by cases, the
relationship X could have with the sets |ϕ| and |¬ϕ|, where both ϕ and ¬ϕ
are consistent formulas. In every case, one can conclude that the model is
not supplemented.

Definition 1.6 (Supplementation). Let M = 〈W,n〉 be a neighborhood
frame. It’s supplementation, M+ = 〈W,n+〉, is the structure in which n+
is defined such that for all w ∈W :
n+(w) := {Y ⊆W : ∃X ∈ n(w) s.t. X ⊆ Y }
Lemma 1.7. Let M be the smallest canonical model for BK. Take M
+ =
〈W,n+, V 〉 to be its supplementation. Then M+ is also a canonical model
for BK.
Proof. We just have to show that the condition on canonical models contin-
ues to hold for n+:
(◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ iff |ϕ| ∈ n+(Γ)
.
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Left to right is immediate, since n(Γ) ⊆ n+(Γ). From right to left,
assume that some |ϕ| ∈ n+(Γ). Then there must be some ψ for which
|ψ| ⊆ |ϕ|, and (◦ψ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ. But if |ψ| ⊆ |ϕ|, then ψ → ϕ is a theorem.
Therefore, (◦ψ ∧ ψ)→ (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) is a theorem, and so (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ.

Theorem 1.8. BK is complete with respect to the class of filters.
Proof. The proof just consists in showing that there is a canonical model for
BK that is supplemented, closed under binary intersection, and contains the
unit. So just consider the supplementation of the minimal canonical model
for BK, M
+. It is obviously supplemented. Furthermore, from axiom b0,
Γ ∈ | ◦ >| for every Γ. Clearly, since Γ ∈ |>| as well, W = |>| ∈ n(Γ) for
every Γ.
For binary intersections, assume X,Y ∈ n(Γ). Then there must be a
ϕ and ψ for which |ϕ| ⊆ X and |ψ| ⊆ Y and such that |ϕ| ∈ n(Γ) and
|ψ| ∈ n(Γ). Then (◦ϕ ∧ ϕ) ∈ Γ and (◦ψ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ. Thus, (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ, and,
from axiom b2, ◦(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ Γ. Therefore, |ϕ ∧ ψ| ∈ n(Γ). |ϕ ∧ ψ| = |ϕ| ∩ |ψ|
and |ϕ| ∩ |ψ| ⊆ X ∩ Y , so X ∩ Y ∈ n(Γ), as desired.

It is also the case that we get another completeness result for free.
Theorem 1.9. BK is complete with respect to the class of augmented frames.
Proof. This is a direct consequence the completeness of BK with respect to
relational frames, combined with the facts that ◦ is definable in terms of ,
and every augmented model is pointwise equivalent to a relational model,
and vice versa.

1.5 Mirror Reduction
In the context of relational semantics, when considering logics extending BK
we encounter the phenomenon that two frames satisfy the same formulas of
L◦ when they are mirror-related: when one frame can be obtained from the
other simply through the addition and/or subtraction of reflexive arrows in
the accessibility relation (a proof can be found in [5]).
We should be able to identify an analogous phenomenon in the context
of neighborhood frames.5
5The guiding intuition is the following: if a formula •ϕ holds at some state w, then we
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Let M = 〈W,n, V 〉 be a model of BK. For each w ∈ W , define Sw :=
{X ∈ P(W ) : w /∈ X}. Furthermore let us define two new models M t+ =
〈W,nt+ , V 〉 and M t− = 〈W,nt− , V 〉 which are obtained from M by way of
the following modifications of the neighborhood function:
nt
+
(w) := n(w) ∪ Sw
and
nt
−
(w) := n(w) \ Sw
for each w ∈W . (F t+ and F t− are defined in the obvious manner.)
We then get the following theorem.
Theorem 1.10. For all w ∈W and α ∈ FormL◦,
M,w |= α iff M t+ , w |= α
and
M,w |= α iff M t− , w |= α
Proof. Both of these are proved by way of straightforward inductions on α.
We will only detail the modal cases.
If M,w |= ◦ϕ then either M,w 6|= ϕ or JϕK ∈ n(w). In the first case, and
in both inductions, we would then have that M t
+
, w 6|= ϕ and M t− , w 6|= ϕ
by the induction hypotheses, which immediately give us that M t
+
, w |= ◦ϕ
and M t
−
, w |= ◦ϕ.
Otherwise, we are in the situation where M,w |= ϕ (i.e. w ∈ JϕK) andJϕK ∈ n(w). There is nothing to show for M t+ , since this model is con-
structed just by adding sets to each n(w), and so the induction hypothesis
immediately gives our result. For M t
−
, however, we point out that becauseJϕK /∈ Sw, JϕK will still be in nt−(w). And so once again all we need is the
induction hypothesis.
In the other direction, assume that M,w 6|= ◦ϕ. This then means that
M,w |= ϕ and that JϕK /∈ n(w). In this case it is the M t− that is immediate,
since if JϕK /∈ n(w) then JϕK /∈ nt−(w). In addition, because w ∈ JϕK, we
should be able to add sets to n(w) so long as we are not adding the truth sets of any of the
formulas that hold at w. On the other hand, to ensure that the truth of ◦ϕ is maintained,
we must make sure not to remove the truth sets of true formulas. Thus, we can add and
subtract sets at will, so long as they are not the truth sets of true formulas.
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 9
255
have that JϕK /∈ n(w) will imply that JϕK /∈ nt+(w), as desired. Thus, the
induction hypotheses finish the proof.

Notice that this theorem just talks about the endpoints of the phe-
nomenon, when we add or subtruct the sets Sw in their entirety. However,
we needn’t add or subtract the entire set Sw from the neighborhoods of w,
but can add or subtract any subset of Sw without consequence.
Corollary 1.11. If F is a frame for BK, then so is F
t+ and F t
−
, as well
as the intermediate frames.
We also point out that in the above canonical model construction we
never have the situation in which w /∈ JϕK but JϕK ∈ n(w) (in either the
minimal canonical model or its supplementation). In other words, when M
is the canonical model, M = M t
−
.
A few nice observations are now immediately forthcoming.
Observation 1.12. No logic extending BK in the language L◦ can express
the consistency of a frame.
Proof. Since ◦> is a theorem, it can never be the case that n(w) = ∅.
But, because of the above result, we can always add ∅ to any n(w) without
consequence.

Lemma 1.13. There are neighborhood frames of BK that are not closed
under intersection and, therefore, are neither filters nor augmented.
Proof. Consider the supplementation of the canonical frame, and notice that
for a propositional variable p, the formula p∧◦p is consistent, so will appear
in some maximal set Γ. Therefore, JpK ∈ n(Γ). In addition, since it will never
be the case that ⊥ ∈ Γ, we do not have J⊥K ∈ n(Γ). However, theorem 1.10
above tells us that we can harmlessly add the set J¬pK to n(Γ). (Call the
model that is the result of doing so M ′). Since JpK ∩ J¬pK = ∅ /∈ n(Γ),
we have violated the closure under intersections condition. Furthermore,
this frame is a BK frame because it is indistinguishable, in BK, from the
supplementation of the canonical frame.
(More simply, just take any model M in which, at some w, M,w |= ϕ
and JϕK ∈ n(w). Then J¬ϕK ∈ Sw, and so is ∅. Thus, add J¬ϕK to n, if it
isn’t already there, and remove ∅, if necessary.)

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Corollary 1.14. There are neighborhood frames of BK that do not have a
pointwise-equivalent relational frame.
Proof. Consider the modelM ′ from the previous lemma. Notice thatM ′,Γ |=
p ∧ ¬p, but that it is not the case that M ′,Γ |= ⊥. However, (p ∧
¬p)→ ⊥ is a theorem of K, and valid on all relational models.

Thus, there are models of BK that are not models for K.
We can perform a similar construction that focuses on monotonicity (and
supplementation) rather than intersections.
Lemma 1.15. There are neighborhood frames of BK that are not supple-
mented.
Proof. At any state w in the canonical model there will always be some ϕ
for which JϕK /∈ n(w). However, we can harmlessly add J⊥K to n(w). The
resulting structure is not supplemented. In addition, on this new frame,
considering the usual modal language, we will get that at w we have both
(⊥ → ϕ) and ⊥, but not ϕ. 
What this means in terms of expressivity is clear: the logic BK lacks the
expressive power to ascertain pertinent semantic properties of its frames,
leading to its being characterized both by the class of filters, as well as a
distinct superclass.6
Semantically, it might suggest that, depending on one’s aims, a neighbor-
hood semantics might be a more interesting semantic tool for these logics:
by restricting one’s attention to the smaller class of frames, one obtains a
more limited view of the semantic behavior of these logics.
1.6 Normal Extensions
A natural question concerns extensions of BK. This problem has been ap-
proached several times, in [5] and [7], and, most recently, in [3], where a
translation between the usual modal language (which we can call L, for
convenience) and L◦ was used to provide reasonably robust techniques for
importing characterization results. Specifically, consider the translation of
formulas in L to L◦ given by:
6Of course, this is not a particularly rare occurrence in modal logic, as characterization
results for K and S5, for example, illustrate.
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p◦ = p
(¬α)◦ = ¬(α◦)
(α ∧ β)◦ = α◦ ∧ β◦
(α)◦ = ◦(α◦) ∧ α◦
We can extend this notation to sets of formulas, by stating that for a set
of L formulas Σ, Σ◦ is just the set of L◦ formulas obtained from Σ by way
of the above translation. With this, for example, one can show that if L is a
canonical normal modal logic axiomatized by some Γ, then, if its canonical
model is contained in the class of (relational) frames C, Γ◦ axiomatizes a
logic (where the rules of inference are MP and bN) that is also complete
with respect to C. Call this logic L◦.
The issue of soundness was also broached in [3], where a sufficient se-
mantic condition for obtaining soundess results for L◦ from L was given.
It was shown that if the class of all L frames, hereafter CL, contains the
reflexive closure of all of its frames, then L◦ is sound with respect to CL. A
corresponding syntactic condition, however, was not given.
We will improve upon this result in two ways. First, we show that
the condition of containing all reflexive closures is in fact also a necessary
condition. Second, we provide the desired sufficient syntactic condition as
well, thereby providing a clearer understanding of the behavior of normal
extensions of BK.
7
Since we are now working with relational frames, the semantic condition
for ◦ is as follows:
M,w |= ◦ϕ iff either M,w 6|= ϕ or, for all x,wRx implies M,x |= ϕ
In addition, we need to make use of a lemma connecting the satisfaction
of formulas in L◦ with those in L.
Lemma 1.16 ([3], Lemma 5.1). Let M = 〈F, V 〉 be a model based on F =
〈W,R〉 and take α to be a formula of the language L. Then, for every
x ∈W :
M,x |= α◦ iff M r, x |= α
7Note that this is not irrelevant to the project of using neighborhood semantics to better
understand these logics, given that, once a characterization of these logics is provided in
either a relational or neighborhood setting, existing results on the correspondence between
relational and neighborhood structures can be used to import this into the other domain,
within which the domain specific semantic insensitivity results can be exploited.
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where M r is the model 〈F r, V 〉 based on the frame F r = 〈W,Rr〉, with
Rr = R ∪ {〈x, x〉 : x ∈W}.
Lemma 1.17. Let L be a normal modal logic. If L◦ is sound with respect
to CL, the class of all L-frames, then CL contains the reflexive closure of
all of its frames.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume that L◦ is sound with respect to CL
but that CL does not contain all reflexive closures. Then there is a frame
F ∈ CL such that F r /∈ CL (i.e. F r is not an L-frame). Because F r is not
an L-frame, we know that there is some theorem ϕ of L that is not satisfied
on some model M that is based on F r. So F r 6|= ϕ.
But since ϕ is a theorem of L, ϕ◦ is a theorem of L◦, and by the assump-
tion of soundness, we have that CL |=ri ϕ◦. Obviously, then, F |=ri ϕ◦.
From lemma 1.16, we then get that F r |= ϕ, a contradiction.

Thus, from the result already present in [3], one obtains the following
theorem.
Theorem 1.18. Let L be a normal modal logic. Then the class of all L
frames, CL, contains the reflexive closure of all of its frames if and only if
L◦ is sound with respect to CL.
We can now give a syntactic condition on L that can be proved to imply
that CL contains the reflexive closure of all its frames. To do so, we use the
well-known boxdot-translation, which, as is shown below, is essentially the
same as the ◦-translation given above.
Definition 1.19. Let ϕ be defined as ϕ ∧ ϕ. Moreover let the boxdot-
translation, from L to L, be given by
p = p
(¬α) = ¬(α)
(α ∧ β) = α ∧ β
(α) = (α) ∧ α.
First of all we notice that the operators ◦ and  are inter-definable.
Indeed, an easy calculation shows that ◦ϕ ∧ ϕ is equivalent to ϕ and thatϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is equivalent to ◦ϕ.
Moreover, as remarked above, the -translation is essentially equivalent
to the ◦-translation. To be more precise, we have the following lemma8:
8[10] makes use of a similar connection between formulas in L◦ and formulas in L to
which the the boxdot-translation has been applied.
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Lemma 1.20. Let α ∈ L by any modal formula. For any relational model
M = 〈W,R, V 〉, we have that
M,w |= (α)◦ iff M,w |= (α)
for any w ∈W . Thus, for any frame
F |= (α)◦ iff F |= (α)
Proof. This is demonstrated by a straightforward induction on α.

Theorem 1.21. Let L be a normal modal logic. CL contains the reflexive
closure of all of its frames if
` α
` (α)
is an admissible rule of inference in L.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. If CL does not contain the reflexive
closure of all its frames, then there is some frame F ∈ CL such that F r /∈ CL.
In other words, there must be some theorem of L, α, such that α is not valid
on F r. This, however, implies that α◦ is not valid on F (from lemma 1.16),
and so, from lemma 1.20, α is not valid on F , and so cannot be a theorem
of L. Thus, the rule is not admissible.

Hence, we can see that the admissibility of this rule9 amounts to a suf-
ficient syntactic condition on the soundness of L◦ with respect to CL. If we
add an assumption about the completeness of L with respect to CL, then
we can turn the conditional in the above theorem into a biconditional.
Corollary 1.22. Let L be a normal modal logic that is also complete with
respect to CL. Then CL contains the reflexive closure of all of its frames if
and only if
` α
` (α)
is an admissible rule of inference in L.
9In [12], it is shown that in the presence of this rule, LT (the logic axiomatized by
adding ϕ→ ϕ to the axiomatization of L) is equivalent to {α : L ` (α)}.
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2 Logics of false belief
2.1 Syntax, Axiomatization, and Semantics
We now turn our attention to the logics of false belief, introduced in [9]. Let
LW be the language in which the well-formed formulas, FormLW are defined
by
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ |Wϕ
We can follow the axiomatization provided in [9] (there referred to as
SW—we rename it in order to maintain more uniform naming conventions).
Let AK be the smallest set of LW formulas containing the following axioms
and closed under the rules.
Axioms:
PL All instances of propositional tautologies
a1 Wϕ→ ¬ϕ
a2 (Wϕ ∧Wψ)→W(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Rules:
MP Modus Ponens
aN from ` ϕ→ ψ one can infer ` (Wϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→Wψ
Semantically, the following clause is used for W :
M,w |=Wϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ and JϕKM ∈ n(w)
Given a doxastic understanding of neighborhoods, and the neighborhood
function, this just says that ϕ is false, but is believed. Thus, it is a false
belief.
In order to prove soundness and completeness results, we make use of
the following definition:
Definition 2.1 (Negatively Supplemented). Let F = 〈W,n〉 be a neigh-
borhood frame. Call F negatively supplemented if (for all w ∈ W and
X,Y ∈ P(W )) X ∈ n(w), X ⊆ Y , and w /∈ Y implies that Y ∈ n(w).
Theorem 2.2. AK is sound with respect to the class of all neighborhood
frames that are closed under binary intersections and are negatively supple-
mented.
Proof. The validity of a1 is immediate from the semantic definition of W .
a2 utilizes closure under intersections, and aN relies on negative supplemen-
tation.

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2.2 Completeness
Definition 2.3 (AK Canonical Model). Let S be a logical system extending
AK and M = 〈W,n, V 〉 be a neighborhood model. M is said to be a canonical
model for S iff the following conditions hold:
1. W = {Γ : Γ is a maximal S-consistent set of wff}
2. For every Γ ∈W , Wϕ ∈ Γ iff |ϕ|S ∈ n(Γ)
3. V (p) = |p|S
When M is such a model, we will name it MS = 〈WS,nS, VS〉.
The fact that the neighborhood function in canonical models is well
defined follows from the fact that ` ϕ↔ ψ implies that `Wϕ↔Wψ (proved
in [9]). Alternatively, assuming that |ϕ|S = |ψ|S and Wϕ ∈ Γ, a1 gives that
¬ϕ ∈ Γ, and thus ¬ψ ∈ Γ as well. From aN , ` (Wϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → Wψ, and so
Wψ ∈ Γ. An analogous argument works for Wψ ∈ Γ implying Wϕ ∈ Γ.
Theorem 2.4. Let M be a canonical model for some S ⊇ AK. Then
JϕKM = |ϕ|
Proof. Assume Γ ∈ JWϕK. Then Γ /∈ JϕK and JϕK ∈ n(Γ). From the
induction hypothesis, |ϕ| ∈ n(Γ), and so, from the definition of the canonical
model, Γ ∈ |Wϕ|.
If Γ ∈ |Wϕ|, Γ ∈ |¬ϕ| and |ϕ| ∈ n(Γ). Then Γ /∈ |ϕ| and so Γ /∈ JϕK butJϕK ∈ n(Γ) (IH). From the semantic definition of W, Γ ∈ JWϕK.

Definition 2.5 (Negative Supplementation). Let M = 〈W,n〉 be a neighbor-
hood frame. It’s negative supplementation, M⊕ = 〈W,n⊕〉, is the structure
in which n⊕ is defined such that for all w ∈W :
n⊕(w) := {Y ⊆W : ∃X ∈ n(w) s.t. X ⊆ Y and w /∈ Y }
Lemma 2.6. Let M be the smallest canonical model for AK. Take M
⊕
to be its negative supplementation. Then M⊕ is also a canonical model for
AK.
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Proof. As before, it only needs to be shown that the neighborhood function
is maintained. That is:
Wϕ ∈ Γ iff |ϕ| ∈ n⊕(Γ)
Left to right is immediate, since n(Γ) ⊆ n⊕(Γ).
In the other direction, assume that |ϕ| ∈ n⊕(Γ). Then there is some ψ for
which |ψ| ⊆ |ϕ| and Wψ ∈ Γ and Γ /∈ |ϕ|. Since |ψ| ⊆ |ϕ|, ` (Wψ ∧ ¬ϕ)→
Wϕ. If Wϕ /∈ Γ, then either Wψ /∈ Γ or ¬ϕ /∈ Γ. The first disjunct is
immediately contradictory. So consider ¬ϕ /∈ Γ. But this implies ϕ ∈ Γ,
which contradicts Γ /∈ |ϕ|.

Corollary 2.7. AK is complete with respect to the class of all neighbor-
hood frames that are closed under binary intersections and are negatively
supplemented.
Proof. The negaitve supplementation of the smallest canonical model is
closed under intersections. 
2.3 Frame Modifications
Before, when dealing with logics of unknown truths, we described modifi-
cations to the neighborhood function that did not affect the satisfiability of
formulas. This corresponded to mirror reduction for relational frames. A
similar question faces us now: what kinds of modifications can we make to
the frames of the logics of false beliefs that do not affect the satisfaction of
formulas? In fact, the relevant property here has a nice symmetry with our
previous property.
Let M = 〈W,n, V 〉 be a model of AK. Consider the following set, for
each w ∈W :
Uw := {X ∈ P(W ) : w ∈ X}
Then, just like before, define two new models Mu
+
= 〈W,nu+ , V 〉 and
Mu
−
= 〈W,nu− , V 〉 where:
nu
+
(w) = n(w) ∪ Uw
and
nu
−
(w) = n(w) \ Uw
(Similarly for F u
+
and F u
−
.)
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Theorem 2.8. For all w ∈W and α ∈ FormLW ,
M,w |= α iff Mu+ , w |= α
and
M,w |= α iff Mu− , w |= α
Proof. Again, we only deal with the modal cases.
Assume M,w |=Wϕ. Then M,w 6|= ϕ and JϕK ∈ n(w). By the induction
hypotheses, Mu
+
, w 6|= ϕ and Mu− , w 6|= ϕ. In the first case, for Mu+ , this
is enough to give that Mu
+
, w |= Wϕ, since JϕK ∈ n(w) trivially impliesJϕK ∈ nu+(w). For Mu− the result follows from noticing that, since w /∈ JϕK,JϕK /∈ Uw, and so JϕK ∈ nu−(w) as well.
In the other direction, assume that M,w 6|=Wϕ. Then either M,w |= ϕ
or JϕK /∈ n(w).
If M,w |= ϕ then the induction hypotheses give that Mu+ , w |= ϕ and
Mu
−
, w |= ϕ. Thus, Mu+ , w 6|=Wϕ and Mu− , w 6|=Wϕ.
So assume then that M,w 6|= ϕ but that JϕK /∈ n(w). However, then
w /∈ JϕK, and so JϕK /∈ Uw. Then, clearly, JϕK is in neither nu+(w) nor
nu
−
(w). 
Corollary 2.9. If F is a frame for AK, then so is F
u+ and F u
−
, as well
as the intermediate frames.
Observation 2.10. No logic extending AK in the language LW can express
that a frame contains the unit.
Proof. Since every w ∈ J>K, this set can always be removed from any n(w)
without consequence.

2.4 The logic K4W
In [9], the problem of axiomatizing K4W (the logic of transitive relational
frames in the language LW) was posed, but so far little progress has been
made to this end. In [9], it was already shown that the class of transi-
tive frames could not be perfectly characterized in LW (due to the sorts of
limitations of expressivity we have already encountered), but the question
of characterizing the class of frames that is indiscernible (with respect to
LW) from the transitive class remains open. We believe that considering the
neighborhood semantics for these logics can shed some light on the problem.
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In the context of neighborhood semantics, transitivity (and validity of
the the 4 axiom) corresponds to the following condition on frames, which
we write as τ(F ) for a frame F = 〈W,N 〉:
∀w ∈W (X ∈ n(w)⇒ {v ∈W : X ∈ n(v)} ∈ n(w)).
Abusing terminology, we call a neighborhood frame F transitive when
τ(F ) holds.
Theorem 2.11. No logic extending AK in the language LW can express
that a frame is transitive.
Proof. One can easily observe that for a transitive F , given a state w and
set X ∈ n(w), w ∈ {v : X ∈ n(v)}. Therefore, by Theorem 2.8, we can
always invalidate τ(F ), for a frame F , without affecting the formulas in the
language LW.

Therefore, no axiomatization can perfectly describe the class of transitive
(neighborhood) frames.
In many ways, however, this is not at all surprising, given what we
know about the expressive limitations of LW logics. In addition, a similar
phenomenon is encountered with the L◦ logics, where their insensitivity to
reflexivity always forces one to seek characterization results not for a par-
ticular class of relational or neighborhood frames, but rather the superclass
incorporating, in addition, all those frames that are modally indiscernible
to the ones in the initial class. This then poses the obvious question of as-
certaining the appropriate superclass of the transitive neighborhood frames,
and axiomatizing that class. However, this project also, and much more
surprisingly, turns out to be problematic. In particular, no superclass (that
is a proper subclass of the class of all frames) of the transitive neighborhood
frames can be finitely axiomatized (in LW).
Definition 2.12. Given a frame F = 〈W,n〉, define its transitive closure
F tc = 〈W,ntc〉 inductively as
⋃
i∈ω
Fi, with F0 = F and Fi+1 = 〈W,ni+1〉,
where ni+1 = tc(ni), defined as
tc(ni)(w) := ni(w) ∪ {mni(X) : X ∈ ni(w)}
for every w ∈W , and
mni(X) := {z ∈W : X ∈ ni(z)}
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for X ⊆W .
The transitive closure of a frame is a frame, since ntc is a function (indeed,
for every i ∈ ω, we have ni ⊆ ni+1), and it is transitive.
Fact 2.13. If X ∈ ntc(w) \ n(w), then w ∈ X.
Proof. Let i be the least natural number such that X ∈ ni+1(w) \ni(w). So
X = {z : Y ∈ ni(z)} = mni(Y ), for some Y ∈ ni(w). Therefore w ∈ X. 
Theorem 2.14. Let M be a model based on a frame F and M tc the corre-
sponding one based on F tc. For all w ∈W and α ∈ FormLW , we have
M,w |= α iff M tc, w |= α.
Proof. We only address the modal case. Assume M,w Wα. Then M,w 6
α and JαK ∈ n(w). By the induction hypothesis, M tc, w 6 α. Since JαK ∈
n(w) ⊆ ntc(w), we then have that M tc, w  Wα. In the other direction,
assume that M,w 6Wα. Then either M,w  α or JαK /∈ n(w). If M,w  α
then the induction hypothesis gives that M tc, w  α. Therefore M tc, w 6
Wα. So assume M,w 6 α, but JαK /∈ n(w). Then w /∈ JαK and so JαK /∈
ntc(w) \ n(w). Thus, JαK /∈ ntc(w) and so, again, M tc, w 6Wα. 
Theorem 2.15. Let α be a consistent sentence in the language LW , and
let Cα = {F : F  α}. If Cα is not the class of all frames, then there is a
frame G such that G /∈ Cα and τ(G).
Proof. Let F = 〈W,n〉 be a frame that does not belong to Cα. Then, by
definition, F 6 α. If τ(F ) holds, then there is nothing to prove. If not
then consider F tc = 〈W,ntc〉, the transitive closure of F . Then τ(F tc), but
F tc 6 α. 
Theorem 2.15 represents an interesting application of the semantic in-
sensitivity of the logics of false belief, that mirrors closely, but in a com-
plimentary manner, the insensitivity to reflexivity of the logics of unknown
truth10. Moreover, the fine-grained look that neighborhood semantics offers,
10The semantic parallel between the treatment of logics of unknown truths and of false
beliefs suggests extending the methodology developed in [3] to the study of logics of false
beliefs (using relational semantics) with the hope that such an approach might shed light
on the open problems posed in [9]. Moreover, the fact that logics of unknown truths are
insensitive to reflexivity, combined with their complementary semantic characterizations,
suggests that one way of understanding the logics of false beliefs is as being insensitive to
irreflexivity. However, the fact that the property of being irreflexive is not expressible in a
Australasian Journal of Logic (14:1) 2017, Article no. 9
266
allows one to better appreciate the, in a certain sense, unstable definition
transitivity receives in the language LW. However, the wider perspective
that neighborhood semantics offers is not always instructive when compared
with relational semantics. Indeed, in [9] it is shown that there exists a sen-
tence that is valid in all transitive relational frames, but not in all relational
frames. This fact does not contradict the above theorem, but tells us that
the transitive closure of a neighborhood frame (like the one required for the
proof of Theorem 2.15) may not necessarily be equivalent to any relational
frame.
3 Conclusion
Although the closer look that neighborhood semantics offer on modal logic
may make it harder to characterize specific classes of frames, nevertheless
it may be used for discovering phenomena that might otherwise go unap-
preciated. For example, the nice complementary classifications that neigh-
borhood semantics provide between the semantic insensitivity of the logics
of false belief and those of unknown truths suggests exploring precisely the
connection between the insensitivity to reflexivity of the RI-logics and the
corresponding insensitivity (on relational semantics) of LW logics. This is
planned for future work.
Coming back to the observations made in the introduction, this paper is
the continuation of the study of the RI-logics started in [3]. As a matter of
fact, one of the aims of this paper is to shed light on connections between
seemingly separate areas of logic: epistemic logic and provability theory.
Not only is the modal operator of the logics of unknown truths interdefinable
with the -operator, but the method of translation between normal modal
logics and RI-logics, proposed in [3], is essentially the same as the so-called
boxdot-translation. Therefore, a general study of the reflexive insensitive
logics may shed light on issues in epistemic logic, formal metaphysics, as
well as provability logic.
normal modal system poses an interesting obstacle to a straightforward transference of the
translation-based technique of [3]. On the other hand, however, it does raise interesting
questions about semantic methods for dealing with this insensitivity. We plan to develop
this observation in future work, but for now it is worth stressing that, using neighborhood
semantics, the semantic treatments of the logics of unknown truths and false beliefs mirror
each other in a perfectly complementary fashion.
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